Of course, the core of the black legend of Iturbide, if it can be summarized in a phrase, is that he ignored the 'will of the nation' by attempting to erect what Bolivar called 'this poor Gothic thing', and what the Mexican Congress in I 8 24 termed 'fragments of the Gothic edifice carefully disinterred'-a monarchy on American soil. 4 The victor writes the history of great events. The historical cloud that hangs over Iturbide originates with the handful of men who wrote the first major commentaries of the War of Independence and the reign of Iturbide. For about a decade after Iturbide's execution at Padilla in I 824, he remained in universal disgrace. In the I 8 3os a brief revival of interest led to some recognition of his greatest contribution -the liberation of Mexico. In I 8 3 3 President Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna ordered his ashes moved from Padilla to the cathedral of Mexico City, but the order was only carried out in I 8 3 8 under Anastacio Bustamante who insisted that Iturbide's remains be placed in a chapel quite separate from the one that held the remains of the 'real' heroes of independence such as Hidalgo and Morelos. Yet, despite an occasional hint of reconciliation, his historical reputation was so effectively and permanently tarnished that when, in I9Io, the bodies of the heroes of independence wete moved to the new Monument to Independence, Iturbide's was left behind. With the exception of Lucas Alaman, who was in Europe until I823 anyhow and therefore not involved in the Iturbide era, the authors of the first influential works about the struggle for independence and Iturbide, such as the devoted republican Fray Servando Teresa de Mier, the moderate republican Carlos Maria de Bustamante, the radical republican Lorenzo de Zavala, or Zavala's close collaborator and exalted federalist in the Acordada revolt, Anastasio Zerecero, all attested firmly that a monarchy with Iturbide on the throne had been a fundamental perversion of the national wilL 5 Of 4 'Manifiesto que el Soberano Congreso Constituyente hizo a los pueblos en los momentos de publicarse el Acta Constitutiva de Ia Federacion', Mexico City, 31 January r8z4, Archivo General de Ia Nacion, Mexico City (hereafter cited as AGN), Gobernacion, Legajo 486, Exp. 4· s Mier's opus is composed chiefly of a mass of pamphlets contemporary with the events.
His course, Mier, Bustamante, and Zerecero were among those deputies in r 822 who suffered imprisonment and persecution at Iturbide's hands. Their writings won the support of most Mexicans and their views -that Iturbide was a usurper who had made himself a tyrant-have had lasting impact. Even the aristocrat Alaman thought Iturbide's assumption of the throne an ill-advised step more worthy of ridicule than angry denunciation. (Alaman thought Iturbide should have let himself be made into a lifetime Regent whose office could be hereditary). Thus, to the epithet of' tyrant' applied by his enemies, Alaman added in the I 8 5os the tag of ridicule. The two most influential contemporary foreign observers, Henry George Ward and Joel R. Poinsett, were also antipathetic toward Iturbide. 6 Behind this first front of most prominent authors, a second group of slightly less importance for the historiography was also tainted by partisanship to some degree. Jose Maria Bocanegra was a federalist, as shown by his decidedly partisan Disertacion apologetica del sistema federal of I 82 5. Jose Maria Tornel published his Breve reseiia historic a in I 8 52, but he had served in the I 82os as Santa Anna's private secretary and could hardly treat Iturbide with equanimity (though, unique among his contemporaries, Tornel considered Iturbide's execution to be illegal). Jose Maria Luis Mora's history of the revolution ended in I 8 I 2 so we have little evidence on his interpretation of subsequent events, though of course he was perhaps the leading philosopher of classic liberalism in Mexico. 7 Vicente Riva Palacio and other authors of the mid-nineteenth century were liberals who opposed monarchy (though the treatment oflturbide in volume 4 of Riva Palacio's lvUxico a travis de los siglo.r, edited by the liberal Enrique de Olavarria y Ferrari, is quite moderate). Francisco de Paula Arrangoiz y Berzabal, though a monarchist under Maximilian, was not an eye-witness of the I 82os and, like Olavarria y Ferrari, simply followed Alainan's passages on the revolution. Niceto de Zamacois was a Spaniard who lived off and on in Mexico but, writing in the I 8 7os and I 8 8os, was already dependent on secondary sources. In the twentieth century the most authoritative biography of Iturbide is that of William Spence Robertson, but at all the key interpretive points of Iturbide's career-his turning against Spain in I Szo, his assumption of the throne, his abdication of the throne-Robertson either confesses himself unable to determine Iturbide's motivations or offers fairly bland explanations. Some authors have attempted to improve Iturbide's image, such as Ezequiel A. Chavez -but his work is riddled with error and suffused with hero worship; and Mariano Cuevas, who, being anti-liberal and pro-clerical, overstates the case for Iturbide, the role of the Masons at that point, and the role of the United States. 9 Suffice it to say that the historiography on Iturbide remains largely partisan and unsatisfactory, with the problem common to such topics of original errors compounded by repetition.
I believe an historical disservice has been done. While recognizing that Iturbide lacked the grandeur of a Bolivar or the modesty of a San Martin, that he was a very fallible mortal, today's historian cannot fail to find him a fascinating subject of study. If viewed from the perspective of his own day, a different image emerges. The matter is best approached by posing the major problems. Why did Mexico, at the moment of its independence, adopt a monarchy? Why was Iturbide made the monarch? Was his accession as emperor legitimate? What went wrong afterward? Why did he abdicate?
The first question is quickly answered. Mexico became a monarchy because the Plan oflguala and Treaties of Cordoba, upon the basis of which independence was achieved, re-created the supposedly legitimate empire of Anahuac, or the Mexican Empire. In keeping with the emerging nationalism of the day, particularly influenced by the work of Francisco Cla vijero, Mexico was seen as an independent entity illegitimately conquered by the Spanish invaders in I 52 I. 10 Iturbide incorporated the concept of calling upon Ferdinand VII and his brothers and nephew in turn to come to Mexico to assume the throne as a method of attracting the support of the powerful European Spaniards of Mexico to the enterprise of independence. The guerrilla leaders, such as Vicente Guerrero, Nicolas Bravo and Guadalupe Victoria, acquiesced because they wanted independence and because, truth to tell, they were not as yet clear in their thinking as to what form of government best suited Mexico. General Guerrero himself, as commander of the first division of the Army of the Three Guarantees had issued a manifesto calling then-Colonel Iturbide 'a magnanimous leader', a 'hero', 'the Father of the Nation'. Insisting that 'He is my chief and I am his subordinate', Guerrero pronounced of Iturbide: 'All the New World is grateful to you, and the most remote generations will pronounce your name reverently' . 11 Very few voices, in fact, were raised against the establishment of a monarchy after publication of the Plan of Iguala. Perhaps the strongest anti-Iturbidista voices of the day were Fray Servando Teresa de Mier and the periodical El Sol. In his 'Memoria politico-instructiva enviada desde Filadelfia ... a los gefes independientes del Anahuac', Mier spoke out against the calling of a Bourbon prince to the Mexican throne, but his reasoning was simply that it would constitute exchanging one brand of slavery for another, that the Bourbons were not fit to be given the prize of Mexico. His years of persecution at the hands of the Spaniards had finally led him to the republican soil of the United States, and he testified that only a republic would represent the interests of all Mexicans. He reminded his readers that, historically, kings were merely idols, manufactured by the pride of private interests, 'they have eyes and do not see', 'they have ears and do not hear'. Yet Mier, too, recognized the political cunning of Iturbide's Plan of Iguala, for he had written, in various United States newspapers that were critical of the idea of calling a European monarch, that 'absolute independence was the object and the base of the Plan, and the rest is a political stratagem imposed by circumstances to incorporate all parties into the network' . 12 would ever darken the soil of Mexico with his presence, Mier essentially endorsed the political purpose of the Plan of Iguala, which was to create an alliance of previously opposing elements in favor of the great goal of independence. The newspaper El Sol, which in I 82 I was the voice of the Scottish-rite Masons and thus anti-Iturbidista, even admitted, in its next to last issue before the proclamation oflturbide as emperor, that republics such as that of the United States were not suited to Mexico and would merely divide the nation up into 'a multitude of small republics' ( El Sol was centralist, of course). 'Is the Mexican people in a condition to constitute themselves a republic?' the journal asked. The editors replied in the negative on the grounds that Mexico lacked the civic virtues and general enlightenment on the part of its citizenry for the exercise of full equality and the franchise. It must be emphasized that El Sol opposed Iturbide; it ceased to publish during his reign as emperor; and it resumed publication only on 2 April I 8 2 3, two weeks after his abdication. In that first issue after resuming publication the editors had to explain away their previous statement in opposition to a republic by saying they had been mistaken. 13 Many other voices were raised in the debate that followed the achievement of independence to argue against the imposition of a republic. The author of one pamphlet pointed out that a republic was not suited to such a large country and, worse yet, it would raise the spectre of the creation of party politics to tear the country apart. 14 Everyone had as their image of a republic not so much the United States, which in those days was little known and also the object of suspicion for its assumed territorial expansionism, but rather the republic of France. With that image in mind, the harmony and peace that the Plan of Iguala promised, with its three guarantees forming a magical triangle of security, held out the greatest hope. There was, of course, widespread disagreement over the Plan's provision to call on a Bourbon, but that was not the same thing as rejecting a moderate monarchy, which was to be based on the Spanish Constitution of I812 until a Mexican constitution could be written. In I82I and I822, except for a few voices whose warnings were drowned out by the mass of comment and commentary, monarchy still had vast prestige. Any other form of government was barely imaginable.
But why Iturbide as emperor? His assumption of the throne is the core of the view of historians that he was a figure suitable to ridicule and scorn. The Constituent Congress (after the abdication of the emperor) discussed in a special commission why Mexico had elevated Iturbide to the throne and concluded that they (the members of the same Congress) had been so fascinated by the brilliant name of their liberator that they had not yet realized the difference between 'independence' and 'liberty' . 15 Countless historians have reviewed the events of r8 and 19 May 1823-the rising of the mob to proclaim Iturbide as emperor, the meeting on I9 May of a frightened Congress intimidated by the mob in the galleries and forced to acquiesce, the hollow pretensions of pomp and circumstance in the months that followed.
There is a kind of selective amnesia at work here that seems to overlook the fact that, in the nine months between Iturbide's triumphal entry into Mexico City and his election as emperor, he ruled the country as chief executive, in his role as president of the Regency. After the death of Juan O'Donoju, no other person had anything approaching the prestige to contradict Iturbide. For the first six months the legislative function was vested in the Sovereign Provisional Governing Junta, which was to bridge the interregnum until the first Congress could meet. But the Junta was hand-picked by Iturbide himself and was, in Alaman's words, 'more a tertulia or concurrence of friends than a deliberating body' . 16 The First Constituent Congress began meeting in February I 8 2 2, technically as the sovereign power, but it was a relatively ineffective body that was inappropriately constituted, internally divided, and made no headway whatever in consolidating the independent state. In November I 8 2 r Iturbide requested the Sovereign Junta to specify precisely what his powers and duties were as Generalissimo and Admiral. The Junta granted him the most sweeping authority. He was to have the command of all land and sea forces, including the appointment of officers from the rank of brigadier down, commandants of provinces, and captains general. He was to be the protector of commerce, navigation, local order and ports. He was to name the two generals who would be chiefs of the general staff. He received the supreme honor of a 2 I-gun salute, and was to have an honor guard of two infantry companies and a military band. Perhaps most striking, the Junta clearly intended that Iturbide would remain as the commander-in-chief even after an emperor was named, for it decreed that he was to 'expedite passports and navigation licenses according to the 15 'Dictamen de la comisi6n especial encargada por el soberano congreso de examinar los puntos de abdicaci6n de !a corona' (Mexico City, 1823), BLAC, Garcia collection. 16 Alaman, Historia, vol. 5, p. 297. orders of the emperor'. 17 There was nothing-except Iturbide's own dedication to the program of Iguala -to prevent the Generalissimo from proclaiming himself, as Bolivar would later do, a dictator. Indeed, his powers at this point probably exceeded those that Bolivar possessed during most points in his career.
It is hard to imagine what force in society could have prevented Iturbide from seizing any powers he liked, should he have chosen to do so, because, in addition to the fact that the army was still 'his' army, the popular deification of the Liberator was a juggernaut that no one could resist, not even Iturbide himself. The 'cult of Iturbide', though its like might have been seen in other countries at other times, was perhaps unique in that it was genuinely spontaneous and not manufactured by the Hero himself or by his claque. Not even the kudos enjoyed by Bolivar in his moments of triumph equalled the cult of Iturbide. It was, I think, primarily the product of the joy and unrestrained relief occasioned by Iturbide's rapid and nearly bloodless victory over the forces of Spain. The Regency declared that fewer than 2oo Mexicans had died in the Iturbide uprising, while Iturbide reported the deaths at less than 1 5 o. 18 In their wildest dreams Mexicans had not foreseen that victory would come in only seven months after the proclamation of the Plan of Iguala. Besides, as yet no one knew of any objections to Iturbide: he was a blameless demigod, and men who would later be his fiercest enemies praised him. Despite the support of men like Guerrero, Bravo and Victoria, the achievement of independence was seen as Iturbide's victory alone.
Javier Ocampo, who made the most complete survey of the contemporary pamphlets of the weeks just after Iturbide's triumph (he found 5 05 in all), counted the titles bestowed by writers on Iturbide. He was the' Immortal Liberator', the' Undefeated Hero', the' New Moses', the 'Protector of the Church', the 'Great Man of God', the 'Honor and Glory of America', the 'Alexander of America', the 'Second Constantine', the 'Victorious David', the' Redeemer of the Fatherland', the' Confusion of Spain', the' Luminous Torch of Anahuac', the 'New Abraham', the 'Trident of Neptune', the 'Surprise of History', the' Ray of Jupiter', and countless more. 19 The only thing that the cult of Iturbide would not allow, in fact, would be his retirement from public life. 
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To deal with the most extreme examples of the glorification of the Hero before looking at those that illustrate substantive qualities, one might cite the reflected glorification of his family. One example was a march dedicated to his wife, Ana Marfa Huarte:
Long live the Wife Of the triumphant warrior, Who with the olive in all its verdure Treats all alike; The loving companion Of the great IruRBIDE
In whom resides Peace, for good or for bad.
Another passage began:
A thousand times happy, oh! you Ana Maria Huarte, united, by a sacred divinity With a hero. 20 An even more extreme example was the solemn funeral memorial held in the parish of San Pablo on 3 December I 8 2 I, to mark the first anniversary of the death oflturbide's mother, Maria Josefa Aramburu de Iturbide, who happened to be buried in the parish. A magnificent pyramid was erected in the church, surrounded by statuary, the building sumptuously decorated inside and out with funeral regalia, the Mass sung by members of the orders of San Diego, La Merced, Santo Domingo, San Francisco and San Agustin, attended by the Regency, the Provincial Deputation, the Ayuntamiento, and all graced by the presence of Iturbide himself. The odes that covered the pyramid included passages such as these:
The pure life of MARIA JosEF A Happy matron, fortunate Mother Of the heroic son, who of the oppressed Fatherland was its illustrious saviour. Worthy mother of the hero Who undaunted recovered The liberty of a World That was unhappily imprisoned by the Lion of Europe.
Another poem lamented her untimely death, less than a year before her son's triumph. 21 Meanwhile, Iturbide's father was given the status of an honorary regent, with full salary and privileges. For Iturbide himself, it goes without saying, nothing was too good. He was President of the Regency, Commander of the Army, Generalissimo and Admiral, granted the title of Serene Highness. A loving nation bestowed upon him a reward of one million pesos and a grant of twenty square leagues of land in Texas 22 for the maintenance of his official household (and he was not yet emperor). The Iturbide family, many years later, settled for a payment in cash of 76o,ooo pesos, while the grant of land remained a dead letter after the loss of Texas. Iturbide's salary was set at I 2o,ooo pesos a year, double the salary of the Spanish viceroy.
Behind the excess of the cult, however, several salient characteristics of the Liberator of Mexico, as seen by the people he liberated, can be found. They serve to answer the question, 'Why Iturbide ?' First, as he said himself, and his words were echoed by a multitude of writers, he had fulfilled the promise of Iguala. In his official proclamation on the day of his triumphal entry into Mexico City, his birthday, 27 September I82I, Iturbide had pronounced the glorious mandate: 'Mexicans: Now you are able to greet the independent Fatherland as I promised you in Iguala'. 23 The Declaration of Independence of the Empire, issued by the Sovereign Provisional Governing Junta on 28 September I82I, announced the consummation of 'The eternally memorable undertaking that a genius superior to all admiration and elogy, love and glory of his fatherland, began in Iguala and pursued, overcoming almost insuperable obstacles, and brought to its end'. 24 Furthermore, Iturbide had achieved this result by a peaceful victory, without the horrors of I 8 Io. He was the pillar of social harmony, unity and peace. The third guarantee had promised equality for the defeated Spaniards, something for which Iturbide fought throughout his time in power, and it had also abolished castes based on race and color. In December I82I the Sovereign Junta decreed as fundamental bases of the constitution of the Empire the Catholic faith, independence and 'the intimate union of all the present citizens of the Empire, or perfect equality ... whether they were born here, or on the other side of the seas'. Any direct or indirect attack in print on these fundamental bases would 22 Regency to lturbide: Mexico City, 22 25 Author after author urged their readers to keep faith with the three guarantees and the Plan oflguala. When a pamphlet appeared in December I 8 2 I entitled' Consejo prudente sabre una de las Garantias', and questioning the right of the European Spaniards to remain secure under the new Empire, the army demanded Iturbide seek out and punish the offending author. 26 He responded instantly (at 3 in the morning) by promising to uphold the third guarantee. The free press law was amended to make it an offense to criticize any of the guarantees, particularly the third. 27 Union, which meant social harmony and the security of the Mexicans and Spaniards in common citizenship together, was one of Iturbide's most impressive pursuits throughout his time as president of the Regency and Emperor.
Preservation of the security of the Spaniards in Mexico was vital, not only because Mexico still hoped for an early recognition by Spain and the other powers of its independence, 28 but also because it was essential to economic survival. One author reminded critics of the Spaniards that it was the third guarantee that had made independence possible. 'Can you forget', he. wrote, 'that it is to this guarantee that we owe our liberty?' 29 Iturbide even sought the settlement in Mexico of yet further Spaniards. In a circular in December I 8 2 I he wrote: 'Seeing how important is the increase in the population of the Empire, it is convenient that the Americans maintain a generous and politic conduct in order to conserve those good Spaniards who exist here with their fortunes, with their development of the arts and agriculture, and to incite many others from the peninsula and other foreigners to live here'. 30 In addition, Iturbide was the protector of the church and salvation of religion. The Plan of Iguala and the Treaties of C6rd@ba had declared the Catholic Church the only official church. Ecclesiastics and laymen alike showered Iturbide with appreciation for this act of courage in an era of doubters and encyclopedists. No less a light than Jose Dominguez (Minister of Justice throughout Iturbide's era) in I 82 I published a pamphlet which was written in irony, pretending to be an attack against religious intolerance. His style was sufficiently forceful, however, that he had to add a note to the pamphlet explaining it was written in irony, meant to provoke admiration for the Hero of America who had defended the faith in the Plan of Iguala. 33 On a less ambiguous note, another author expressed his eternal thanks 'to our Catholic Liberator, the Second Constantine ... Long live the Catholic Iturbide, long live our most Christian defender ... Unconquered General of the Nation ... Frightener of the impious, valiant Hero, Great defender of our Religion'. 34 In perhaps the most visible of the great state occasions of Iturbide's time, his coronation as emperor, Bishop Antonio Joaquin Perez of Puebla, in his sermon, cited as one ofiturbide's greatest strengths his Christian piety: 'We glorify the Lord because He had our emperor born of progenitors who inspired in him piety ... We glorify Him because He granted him teachers who above all things fortified in his soul the Catholic Religion'. 35 Sonora wrote Iturbide: 'To you alone belongs the glory because you alone were chosen by God'. 36 In short, Iturbide was the one the Lord had given. Other common themes emerge from the shower of pamphlets that appeared just after Iturbide's triumph to help explain why he became emperor. It was widely recognized that two fundamental forces pointed him toward the throne. One was that he was Mexican-born. The other was that, in the minds of many contemporaries, quite simply, they owed him the monarchy for his incalculable gift of independence. From September I 8 2 I there were frequent calls for him to take the throne. His accession in May r 822 was not the act of a simple mob operating with no precedent and no public support. Quite the contrary, there had been calls for him to assume the throne all along. As one author had it: 'We should think of a Monarch who unites in himself the circumstances of being from this country, Catholic, prudent, known, valiant, a lover of the Fatherland and loved by its people. And who more fits this case than the Hero of our days?' 37 Once it was known that Ferdinand VII and his government had completely rejected the Treaties of Cordoba, it was argued that Mexico was free to select whomever it wished. It was no longer bound by that part of the Treaties that prescribed a Bourbon for the throne. One author made this point forcefully, insisting that it was utterly incompatible that Mexico was now' a free nation, but without liberty to elect a monarch: A sovereign nation, yet with its sons deprived of sovereignty'. 'It is true', he argued, 'that in the Plan of Iguala our Generalissimo proposed that Ferdinand VII, or a member of his dynasty, should be our emperor; which plan, formed with the presumed will of the Nation, has been confirmed with the express will of the Nation ... And we know that in most of the towns they have already proclaimed our Generalissimo as emperor ... Let our Generalissimo be crowned'. He concluded by pointedly remarking 'that having exposed my life for the liberty of my country, it only remains for me to cooperate in its just advancement, which I judge will consist in seeing one of our own sons crowned'. 38 When Iturbide issued a public manifesto refusing the acclamations that he should assume the throne, he was answered by an author who directed at Iturbide a pointed question: 'If the common view of the people, that is, not of some individuals in particular but of the people in general, fulfilling their duty of gratitude, proclaims Your Excellency as Emperor ... how can Your Excellency resist the vote of all the nation'? The legitimacy of his election would lie in the will of the nation. 39 Fernandez de Lizardi had been one of the first to proclaim Iturbide emperor, in a pamphlet of 29 September I 821. He testified that during the three days following Iturbide's triumphal entry in the capital 'the most common, and even most general, opinion, was no other but that Sr. Iturbide should be crowned'. He had declared at the time: 'If Your Excellency is not Emperor, our independence will be damned'. 40 The pressure was sufficiently strong that in October I 8 2 I Iturbide issued a manifesto declaring that he did not aspire to the throne and stating his misgivings about the problem of electing a monarch, which could simultaneously give rise to aristocratic factions and to the tumult that democracy had a tendency to encourage. 41 A prolific if not totally devoted family man (his eighth child was born while he was emperor and his ninth was born a few months after his execution in Padilla), he frequently said he sought only peace and retirement.
The only real question, indeed, would seem to be why Iturbide gave up his resistance to becoming emperor after nine months of denial. One clue comes from a series of letters he sent out to the commandants and captains general of the various provinces on 2 7 March I 8 2 2. He asked a series of questions about public opinion in each province regarding the Congress, the present cabinet, the national militia and other matters. But the question of most obvious interest to Iturbide was, what was the public view regarding monarchy or republic in each province? The replies arrived quickly in late March and early April, and Iturbide could only have been greatly encouraged by them. Almost every commandant and captain general whose letter has been preserved insisted, as Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna of Veracruz put it, that 'the most sensible and enlightened part of the people adopts the constitutional monarchical government. The Republican system has few adherents, and its addicts are persons of little thought'. He added that many partisans of a republic were motivated only by the desire to prevent a foreigner or a Spaniard taking the throne. Pedro Telmo Primo of Queretaro reported that the constitutional monarchy was preferred by his people, and that 'it would make the Empire in a very short 39 44 There is general agreement that the election by Congress was, strictly speaking, illegal, owing to the absence of a quorum and to the fact that the congressional record clearly shows repeated examples of deputies being interrupted when they spoke in a way that the gallery thought was negative. It is, however, important to point out that no member actually voted against Iturbide's election. The I 5 who voted negatively were supporting a proposal to refer the question to their respective provinces for advice. In addition, the congressional record noted that some deputies 42 
94
Timot~ E. Anna did not vote because, having been among the 47 members who signed the motion of Gomez Farias, they had already expressed their will. In the following days Congress voted on various other questions concerning the monarchy, and on those occasions a quorum was present. The fact remains, however, that to Iturbide's enemies and to future generations of Mexicans and historians alike, the accession of Iturbide was the most inexcusable blot on his record. In I 82 3, immediately after Iturbide's abdication, Fernandez de Lizardi wrote perhaps the most touching and human commentary on the tragedy of the emperor when, in the form of a soliloquy meant to be performed by an actor representing Iturbide, he has the deposed monarch say:
This crown, yes, this crown. This infamous mantle and this sceptre Common to the tyrant and to the pious To the hypocritical king, to the good Caesar They flattered my pride, they enchanted me They broke my good intentions For them I transgressed. 45 The question, however, of whether Iturbide' s accession to the throne was legitimate in the fullest sense, rather than whether the act of the election was strictly according to congressional bylaws, strikes me as a more important point. Was it the general will of the nation? Recognizing that no one can authoritatively determine the will of a nation (although nearly every polemicist of the 182os claimed to), the question is, rather, are there indications of substantive nationwide opposition? The answer is no. As Lorenzo de Zavala, who by 1823 had become a leading republican, later pointed out, it is not conceivable that Congress would have chosen anyone else as emperor. 46 It is not strictly correct to argue that Iturbide's election somehow interrupted the nation's inevitable move toward a republic because, in 1822, the movement for a republic was not yet strong. Some of the leading advocates of a republic were not yet present in the capital. Father Mier, though he expressed himself dumbfounded that Congress had not established a republic, was at this point still a prisoner in Uhia. (He was released, in fact, two days after Iturbide's election.) Zavala said that, although there were republicans in Congress, no one called for a republic and, after heaping scorn on the idea of a monarchy, Zavala pointed out that the republicans of 1822 wanted a republic with clerical and military 45 of a monarch free. The more critical point, however, was whether the national consensus in favor of the Plan of Iguala had also constituted a consensus in favor of a moderate monarchy. The periodical El Hombre Libre, the other major journal of the day besides El Sol, argued on 17 May r Szz, the day before the mob took to the streets to proclaim Iturbide emperor, that the nation had not consented to a monarchy because the Plan of Iguala was the work of one man only, that no corporation or disinterested group had been consulted before its proclamation, and that the adherence of the nation after its proclamation was not conclusive because, the periodical asked, what town or corporation could have refused to recognize the Plan ? 50 because I contrived it, I organized it, I published it, and I put it into execution'. He insisted, however, that it was only victorious because of the general approbation of the nation:
I was the depository of the will of the Mexicans: in the first place because what I signed in their name is what they ought to have wished for; in the second place because they had already given me many strong proofs of their real approbation to it, joining to me those amongst them capable of bearing arms, others assisting me by all the means that were in their power, and receiving me all in the towns through which I passed with acclamations and praise ... As no one was compelled by force to make these demonstrations, it is evident that they approved my designs, and that their will was similar to mine. 51 In the end, one must agree with Iturbide, no matter how evident the role played by his own ego. There were massive and sustained demonstrations of support for him, for the Plan, and presumably for every plank of the Plan. To argue that a national consensus existed in support of only certain planks and not others is to pretend to possess knowledge of public opinion that cannot be clearly distinguished in the Mexico of I 822, where as yet few regular periodicals existed and those that did were partisan organs. There was no substantial opposition to Iturbide becoming emperor. The cult of Iturbide's deification which has already been described is enough to substantiate an argument that in May I 822 his accession to the throne was legitimate.
What, then, went wrong? It was Iturbide's nine-month reign as emperor that constituted his failure. The answer, of course, is that Iturbide took a series of actions that the Mexican people found insupportable and the historiography finds inexcusable. Yet, few treatments of his reign emphasize the extent to which Iturbide is made to carry the blame for events over which he had little control.
Most obvious, but of relatively little importance, is the fact that, in a country bankrupted by the independence war, and despite the fact that as president of the Regency he had frequently given up or returned emoluments, Iturbide as emperor overspent in a manner that was thought 51 55 All personal expenditures would have been forgiven, of course, if Iturbide had been able to meet the multitude of demands for employment and reward that bombarded him. The condition of the treasury would not permit it. One of Iturbide's defenders insisted that everyone aspired to be a general. 56 Zavala wrote: 'It is not easy to conceive of how many ambitions, both great and small, it was necessary to satisfy in order not to make for discontent'. 57 The army frequently complained of lack of adequate reward. 58 ious men of the Army of the Three Guarantees went hungry and ragged. They were looked upon with disdain, and the author wondered: 'Perhaps, is it because many of them are of lower color?' 59 Another author commented in a satire that in the public view, at least among the lower classes, independence had brought no benefit, that it would always be a case of 'the same friar on a different mule'. 60 There were many concerns that Iturbide showed preference for the peninsulars and creole nobles who made up his court. The most general complaint, however, was of a lack of public services and an increase in crime. Iturbide's Council of State itself informed Congress that 'the administration of justice is paralysed'. The fiscal of the audiencia of Mexico City declared that there was more crime at the end of I 8 2 2 than under the old regime, but he blamed Congress for failing to enact adequate laws. 61 Even the limitation on slavery, one of the most significant social reforms of the period, was a half-hearted affair.
No new slave was to be imported, and all children of slaves were declared free at the age of fourteen, but existing slaves were to remain in servitude. 62 Iturbide's famed colonization decree of January I823 permitted foreigners settling in Texas to bring in their slaves, though they could not buy or sell them once in Mexican territory, and the children of slaves belonging to such colonists were to be free at the age of fourteen. 63 Among civil servants, members of the army, merchants and property owners (a formidable alliance, indeed), one of the most galling aspects of Iturbide's rule was his taxation and salary discounts. On I I March I 822 the Congress ordered salary discounts of from 8 % to 20% for all civil and military employees, exempting only Iturbide, his father, and the widow of Juan O'Donoju (who had been granted a large pension). Iturbide himself made the gesture of accepting the full 20 % salary discount on his own salary, and later, at his urging, Congress exempted the military. 64 The Regency had ordered a forced loan of I. 5 million pesos shortly after independence, but Congress cancelled it in March 1822. Yet, in April, Congress opened a 'voluntary loan' in all provinces, the sums to be assigned by local city councils. In November the Junta Nacional Instif~Q~ente ordered another forced loan of 2.8 million pesos. 65 In December, the same Junta, with the emperor's approval, of course, ordered the creation of 4 million pesos of paper money, to be used to pay one-third of all salaries. All merchants were ordered to accept up to one-third of payments in the paper. 66 Since the money instantly lost all public credit, this constituted a salary cut of one-third for its recipients. The next day the emperor decreed that since the projected 1823 budget would have a deficit of 6 million pesos, there was to be a direct tax of that amount, each province being assessed according to its population. All persons, except those over seventy years old and ecclesiastics, would pay an additional special tax of 4 reales a year. Most startling, a property tax of 40% was established for all property owners, except the Church, which would pay 5 %. 67 Remembering that the decrees of paper money and 40% property taxes occurred after the uprising against Iturbide had begun in Veracruz, these enactments provoked massive protest. One author wrote: 'Perhaps the Government of today is the tyrant of yesterday'. 68 In the political arena the enactments that were most held against Iturbide were manifold. He twice decreed that it was illegal to publish anything that threatened the existing form of government or the Three Guarantees, thus curtailing freedom of the press. In August the emperor and Council of State, in response to the conspiracy of Father Mier to create a republic, created special military tribunals in each provincial capital to try common criminals as well as all those who conspired against the government, thus suspending the articles of the Spanish Constitution relating to the arrest and trial of suspects. 69 On 21 December 1822, after the uprising in Veracruz had begun, the emperor again created special military tribunals. 70 65 Decrees of Congress, Mexico City, I 6 March and I 6 April, I 8 22; Decree of Junta As is well known, however, the fundamental political enactment on the emperor's part that provoked the uprising was, first, his arrest of a number of members of Congress and, subsequently, his dissolution of Congress altogether. Claiming that a plot to create a republic had been uncovered, Iturbide on 26 August I 822 ordered the arrest of about 5o individuals, including I 5 congressmen, among whom were Carlos Marfa de Bustamante, Jose Fagoaga, Jose Joaquin de Herrera, Jose del Valle, Anastacio Zerecero and Father Mier, the latter accused by the government of being the leader of the plot. 71 In response to these imprisonments, Felipe de la Garza, commander of the Interior Provinces of the East, attempted an uprising to demand the release of the deputies and the freedom of Congress, as well as the removal of the emperor's ministers. 72 Though Garza's rebellion was quickly crushed, and he was even pardoned by the emperor, the minister of Colombia, Miguel Santa Maria, who was a supporter of the conspiracy for a republic, was given his passport and ordered to leave Mexico. Iturbide took the final step on 3 I October, announcing the dissolution of Congress and its replacement with a Junta Nacional Instittgente, composed of two deputies for every province with a large population and one deputy for each small province, all the members to be chosen by himself from among the deputies of the dissolved Congress. Iturbide accused Congress of failing to live up to its primary duties -which were to formulate a constitution, organize national finances, and maintain the army and civil service. 'Being responsible for perfecting the work that I began and which the nation by its general vote confided in me, I cannot permit [Congress] to ruin [this work].' 73 The members of the Junta Instittgente were announced on I November, and seated on 2 November. 74 The Bishop of Sonora, Marques de Castaiiiza, as the eldest member of the Junta, served as its president, assisted by two member secretaries. With such villainous people It is certain they will legislate To the pleasure of the Great Sultan A magnificent sermon Will be the Constitution That these brutes form. 75 (In fact, the Junta was composed of only 45 members.) Further exhibiting the extraordinary ego that so angered Mexicans, Iturbide in the act of installation of the Junta declared that since independence 'my voice ... constituted the single organ of the general will of the inhabitants of this empire'. 76 The dissolution of Congress, of course, gave rise to two other fundamental charges against Iturbide: that he had broken the vow of Iguala, which called for the Spanish Constitution of I 8 I 2 to remain in effect until Mexico could replace it with its own constitution; and that he was a tyrant. Most fundamental in the strictly legal view, however, is that Iturbide had also broken his investiture oath rendered to Congress on 2 I May I822, in which he promised to respect and obey the acts of Congress, the political liberty of the nation, and the personal security of each individual, swearing that 'if in that which I have sworn, or any part thereof, I should do the contrary, I should not be obeyed'. 77 What is often overlooked in the presentation of Iturbide's dissolution of Congress, however, is the fact that in its nine months in existence Congress had failed to address the basic issues of the consolidation of the empire, and that it was defective and deeply marred in its makeup and membership. At the time Congress was created, a strict adherence to the Spanish Constitution of I 8 r 2 had not been possible because of the lack of valid census statistics for Mexico upon which to base the proportional representation. As a result, it had been decided that Congress would be composed of deputies based on the number of partidos in each intendancy or province (the Internal Provinces and California, at that time, did not have intendancies). That would have made for 242 members, which was considered too many, so it was determined in the end that there would 75 be deputies from each intendancy or province equal to two-thirds the number of partidos. Thus, the intendancy of Mexico, with 43 partidos, had 28 deputies; Guadalajara, with 28 partidos, had 17 deputies, and so on. The problem was that the distribution of partidos was more a product of territorial extent and defense needs than population, so that, incredibly, among the Internal Provinces of the West, Durango had 3 4 partidos (hence, 23 deputies), while Arizpe had I 2 partidos (thus, 8 deputies). 78 In addition, it was decreed that each province with more than one deputy must have among its representatives an ecclesiastic from the secular clergy, a member of the army, and a magistrate or lawyer. After choosing these three deputies, the other members elected could not be from any of these professions. Furthermore, the province of Mexico was also required to select one miner, one titled noble, and one mcryorazgo; while Guadalajara and Veracruz were to choose one merchant; Puebla and Sonora, one artisan; Nueva Vizcaya and Valladolid, one manufacturer; San Luis Potosi and Yucatan, one employee; and Guanajuato, one miner. 79 The emperor had long complained that this formation of Congress had made for 'monstrous inequality' among the provinces and for the election of deputies based on profession rather than talent. Durango, with 2oo,ooo inhabitants, had 23 deputies, while Guanajuato, with more than 4oo,ooo inhabitants, had only 7 deputies. Iturbide had requested Congress in early October to reduce the number of members, which Congress had refused to do. It was in the wake of this disagreement that Iturbide dissolved what he considered an unwieldy Congress, founded on what he called' demagogic and anarchistic forms', in favor of a smaller Junta Instit'!)'ente. 80 Nor is it fair to charge, as Santa Anna immediately did, that Iturbide appointed only his loyal followers from among the deputies to make up the new Junta Instit'!Yente. Indeed, several former and future republicans were among their numbers. One was Francisco Argandar, one of the few men who had been a member of Morelos' more definite powers in its relations with the executive.) 81 Furthermore, only four men from among those 47 deputies who had signed the motion of Gomez Farias on 19 May, urging Iturbide to take the throne, were included on the Junta lnstif1!Jente. Gomez Farias himself was not one of them. While most of the Congressional caucus from Guadalajara had signed the petition, the two members chosen for the Junta from Guadalajara were not among them. There is no real evidence to assume that Iturbide only picked sycophants to compose the Junta Instit1!Jenfe. Iturbide, admittedly myopic on the subject, insisted that the Junta Instif1!Jente was as representative as the Congress, and a lot more effective. Within less than two months it had produced a projected constitution. Taking their cue principally from Carlos Marfa de Bustamante, most historians rapidly conclude the story oflturbide by saying that the outrage of his dissolution of Congress turned the nation against him, provoked the uprising of Santa Anna and Guadalupe Victoria in Veracruz in December 1822, and led by March 1823 to his overthrow. Bustamante wrote, for example: 'The will of the Mexican Nation, decided at the beginning of January 1823, was known to all except he who ruled its destiny: from all sides resounded a general clamour against the new throne, heard by all except he who was seated on it'. 82 This considerably overstates the degree of national consensus.
Bustamante did not take adequate care to emphasize that there were actually three uprisings against Iturbide and that the second and third of those uprisings did not call for Iturbide's overthrow, while the first is so ambivalent that it is hard to be certain what it wanted. The first was the rising of Santa Anna and Guadalupe Victoria on 2 December I 822 in the city of Veracruz. Santa Anna admitted in his autobiography that he was primarily provoked by the fact that Iturbide had ordered him removed from his command and transferred to Mexico City. 83 Historians universally say that Santa Anna called for the creation of a republic. The fact, however, is, he both did and did not. On 2 December he issued one proclamation to the citizens of Veracruz, one to the soldiers under his command, and one 'Plan'. In all of them he put the emphasis on the demand that the Congress be reinstated. But only in the first of the proclamations did he call for the creation of a republic. In the proclamation to his soldiers he 81 never mentioned a republic, though he did refer to Iturbide as a tyrant. More importantly, in his 'Plan' of 2 December he merely called for the re-institution of the Sovereign Congress, which would 'examine the vote of the provinces, hear the learned men and public writers, and in the end, after a mature examination, declare the form of government' that most suited Mexico. Similarly, on 6 December, Santa Anna published a number of 'clarifications' to what was called the 'Plan of Veracruz', written by Miguel Santa Maria, the Colombian diplomat then awaiting a ship in Vera cruz. It called for the restoration of Congress, but it did not mention a republic. In 22 rambling articles, it only once mentioned that the orders of Iturbide should no longer be obeyed. On 6 December Santa Anna also wrote a letter to Iturbide, explaining that he had felt compelled to withdraw himself from obedience to the emperor because Iturbide had broken his oaths and infringed the Plan oflguala and Treaties of Cordoba. 'My idea is that a congress should be reunited ... so that it can freely and spontaneously constitute the form of government most convenient and analogous to this country. This Congress will take care to justly reward your merits ... providing you a very distinguished place in the nation'. Santa Anna concluded by expressing his love for Iturbide and his willingness to sacrifice himself to defend Iturbide's life. 84 The massive propaganda campaign launched against Santa Anna from Mexico City, combined with the attack of the imperial expeditionary troops still loyal to Iturbide, soon drove Santa Anna back to the confines of the port of Veracruz, and everyone expected his uprising would shortly be terminated.
The second rising began on 5 January I 8 2 3, when Generals Vicente Guerrero and Nicolas Bravo, who, together with Guadalupe Victoria, were considered the senior guerrilleros of independence, stunned Iturbide by 84 slipping out of Mexico City and raising a rebellion in the south. In a letter to Brigadier Francisco Antonio Berdejo on r 3 January, Bravo wrote that their motivation was to restore Congress. He attested: 'You can see that neither do we aspire to a republic nor do we want to designate the form of government that should be adopted. We are in conformity with whatever [form of government] and even with the established one as long as it should be legitimized by the nation and its representatives. We do not demand anything more than the national representation that the emperor destroyed'. 85 This rebellion, too, soon came to nothing, and Guerrero was so severely wounded in a contest with imperial troops that his death was widely reported. Guerrero survived, but was out of the picture for some months. Bravo eventually joined up with Santa Anna and Victoria in Veracruz.
The third rising was the most important. The generals commanding the imperial expeditionary army that went out against Santa Anna were Iturbide's closest friends. They were Generals Jose Antonio Echavarri, Luis de Cortazar and Jose Maria Lobato. After driving Santa Anna back to the port of Veracruz and establishing a siege against him, they proclaimed on I February I 8 z 3 at their general headquarters the so-called Plan of Casa Mata. This was a stunning shock to Iturbide, but mainly because of the defection of such close colleagues. Iturbide later wrote of Echavarri: 'I had always behaved with him as with a brother ... I had trusted him with secrets as I would have done to a son'. 86 Iturbide sent out General Pedro Celestino Negrete, the highest ranking officer in the imperial army and considered the second most powerful man in the empire, as a commissioner to the rebellious Echavarri. Unexpectedly, Negrete also endorsed the Plan of Casa Mata. The combined leadership of the 'liberating army' as it was called, settled their headquarters in Puebla and, although they preferred Echavarri as their leader, finally opted for the Captain General of Puebla, the Marques de Vivanco, because Echavarri was a Spaniard.
It is critical, however, to note that the Plan of Casa Mata, like the Plan of Veracruz and the Bravo-Guerrero uprising, was motivated by outrage at the dissolution of Congress. It called for the restoration of Congress as the seat of national representation, not for the overthrow of Iturbide. Echavarri, in a letter from Casa Mata on I February I823, told Ramon Rayon that: 'Upon pronouncing our votes for the installation of the ro6 Timotf?y E. Anna Congress we have considered as a sacred duty the conservation of the emperor, and as a result these armies attempt no act against his august person which they respect as inviolable'. 87 The Plan of Casa Mata itself consisted of two primary points. First: 'It being incontrovertible that sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, the Congress will be installed with all possible brevity'. Second: 'The Army will never make any attempt against the person of the emperor'. 88 There was no demand for Iturbide's overthrow, the act was undertaken by men closest to him among all the officers, the demand was only for the restoration of the Congress, which Iturbide granted. Proof that the imperial government, though disappointed perhaps by the generals' action, was not terrified of it is the fact that on r 8 February the government itself published, without comment, a copy of the Act of Casa Mata. 89 The Provincial Deputation of Mexico, which on z6 February told the Marques de Vivanco that it entirely supported the reunion of a Congress, wrote to the emperor on r March: 'The nation is on the verge of its ruin ... To save it is the duty of Your Majesty ... The incontestable majority of the Nation ... has set its sights and desires on a national representation as the only remedy of the evils that have weighed upon them; they want a constituent Congress'. 90 On 4 March the emperor published the decree calling for the reopening of the dissolved Congress (as opposed to the election of a new one), and on 7 March the Congress began to meet. The leaders of the liberating army agreed to recognize the Congress. 91 To summarize, then, there were three separate uprisings against Iturbide, all motivated by the demand for restoration of Congress. The Vera cruz movement of Santa Anna and Victoria initially proclaimed a republic, and Santa Anna in his own memoirs insisted he had been the first to proclaim a republic, yet their formal Plan of Veracruz made no mention of a republic. The abortive Bravo-Guerrero uprising in the south wanted only the restoration of national representation. Bravo attested he could live with the emperor as long as that concession was granted, and that it was not his goal to create a republic. The Plan of Casa Mata directly guaranteed the person of the emperor and the institution of the monarchy, requiring only the installation of national representation. The legitimacy of the monarchy and of Iturbide's accession to the throne is reinforced by the unwillingness of all but Santa Anna to proclaim against it.
Yet, on 19 March the emperor submitted his abdication to the Council of State. Since the rebels of Casa Mata had not demanded it, why did the emperor abdicate? He had not been defeated by his enemies. The moderate wing then commanding the bulk of the army favored continuation of the monarchy. Several provinces were on record as still strongly favoring monarchy and opposed to a republic. As he showed with his ill-fated return in 1824, Iturbide was not given to blind panic or personal fear, indeed his ego would not have permitted abandonment of the field without cause.
The more solid reasons for Iturbide's abdication are political. Three devastating political considerations became clear to Iturbide by mid-March. First, on 23 February 1823, while the Junta Instit'!)'ente was debating the grounds on which Congress should be established again, the Subsecretary of Relations, Andres Quintana Roo, submitted to the emperor's secretary, Francisco de Paula Alvarez, his opinion that the restored Congress must have no restriction placed on the subjects it could debate, as the Junta Instit'!)'ente was contemplating. 'The Junta wants Congress to be unable to discuss the fundamental points ... such as religious intolerance, the moderate monarchy, and others. It is an absurdity in politics to proscribe this kind of limit on the legislative power.' While Quintana Roo went on to discuss religious intolerance as an example of something Congress must be permitted to debate, the real point was that he had made it clear that a truly independent Congress would and should debate the very existence of the monarchy itself. 92 Two days later Alvarez announced that the emperor, astounded at the hypocrisy of Quintana Roo's willingness to 'open up opinions diametrically opposed to the bases that the nation has adopted', fired him as Subsecretary. 93 The second political consideration is revealed by a statement of Carlos Maria de Bustamante who, in passing, comments upon the role of the army in the Act of Casa Mata: 'A nation that has arrived at knowledge of its true interests is not capable of retracing its steps on the road to liberty, Timotry E. Antta and the armed forces should be their support'. He spoke of the army as the 'true friend of the public' which was about to provide 'a protecting hand that would save the nation at the edge of ruin'. 94 A third, and even more subtle political consideration, was explained by Nettie Lee Benson. The Plan of Casa Mata, although it did not call for the creation of a republic but actually guaranteed the continuation of the monarchy, had the effect of destroying the central government. Article ro of the r r-part Plan of Casa Mata called for government in the province of Veracruz to be vested in the provincial deputation of Veracruz until the crisis was resolved. As Benson pointed out, not even Iturbide at first recognized the subtle destructive impact of this article, nor did the commanders of the liberating army. Article 10 caused each of the thirteen provincial deputations in the country to adopt the Plan of Cas a Mata almost immediately, for it assured each provincial deputation that it could take over administrative control of its respective province. Thus the deputation of Puebla proclaimed the Plan on 14 February and assumed control of its province; Guadalajara's deputation proclaimed the Plan on z6~z7 February; Queretaro on the 27th; San Luis Potosi in the first week of March; Yucatan on 4 March; Guanajuato and Michoac::in on 8 March; while Oaxaca and the Eastern Interior Provinces created provisional governing juntas. Most of the provinces immediately abolished Iturbide's forced loans, special taxes and the paper money. 'By the middle of March, 1823, Mexico, instead of being a united country, was broken up into virtually autonomous provinces', which neither the emperor nor the Congress could control. 95 In short, Iturbide, the man who had made independence and who had everything disposed as he wanted heretofore, was presented with the spectre of having imposed upon him a Congress that would exercise real sovereignty, including discussion of the most fundamental bases that he held dear~ religious exclusion and a constitutional monarchy and which, if it could abolish those two planks, could no doubt do away with any other part of the Plan of Iguala. Indeed, on 8 April the restored Congress did annul the Plan of Iguala and Treaties of Cordoba, though it retained the three guarantees. 96 
